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HOW THE WORLD DREAMS ITSELF TO BE
AMERICAN: REFLECTIONS ON THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EXPANDING
SCOPE OF TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND
FREE SPEECH NORMS
Keith Aoki*
[O]ur modern media images, if they fascinate us so much it is
not because they are sites of the production of meaning and
representation-this would not be new-it is on the contrary
because they are sites of the disappearance of meaning and
representation.... I
But Hollywood moguls don't just make movies anymore; they
control TV and cable networks, newspaper chains, magazineand book-publishing empires-the information flow of the
nation.
In that sense, they can create havoc in our culture as surely as a
Michael Milken can rock the market.2
I. INTRODUCTION

Newspaper headlines ring out the news of yet another merger or
acquisition between or by information-based corporations. 3
These
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Oregon School of Law; B.F.A. 1978, Wayne

State; M.A. 1986, Houston College; J.D. 1990, Harvard Law School; L.L.M. 1993, University of
Wisconsin, Madison School of Law. I would like to acknowledge my deep debt to the
groundbreaking work of Rosemary J. Coombe, James Boyle and Margaret Chon. I would also
like to thank my colleagues Garrett Epps, Ibrahim Gassama, Dennis Greene, and Lisa
Kloppenberg free their comments. I would also like to express my gratitude for the superb
research assistance of Anne Fujita, David Munsey, and Mary Anne Murk as well as to Professor
Lisa Ikemoto for inviting me to participate in this Symposium.
1. Jean Baudrillard, The Evil Demon of Images and the Precession of Simulacra, in
POSTMODERNISM: A READER (Thomas Docherty ed., 1993).
2. Frank Rich, Mickey Mouse Clubbed, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1996, at A6.
3. Robert W. McChesney, The Global Struggle for Democratic Communication, 48
MONTHLY REV. 1, 2 (July-Aug. 1996):

524

LOYOLA OFLOSANGELES ENTERTAINMENTLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 17

newspaper headlines and stories, happy to proclaim the marriage of one
multi-million dollar company with another, fail to address the public
consequences of these mergers and employ language that keeps the public
from closely scrutinizing the affects of these mergers. Absent from the
reports on such mergers is any discussion of the information industries as
the site of cultural production, or of the political role of the information
industry. These news bytes ignore corporate colonization of nations
resulting from the proliferation of commodified media images, distributed
and controlled by a few mega corporations. It may be noted that the
"globalization of media imagery is surely the most effective means ever for
cloning' ' cultures to make them compatible with the Western corporate
vision.
[T]here are five global vertically integrated media companies: New Corp., Disney,
Time Warner. Viacom, and TCI. There are several other media firms with global
ambitions including General Electric (owner of NBC), Westinghouse (owner of
CBS), Sony, Seagram (owner of MCA). and a few European giants led by Philips
(owners of PolyGram), Havas and Bertelsmann AG.
Id.: Mergers Were Biggest Offshoot of Telecom Overhaul, ASSOCIATED PRESS. Feb. 4, 1997
(Local phone company Bell Atlantic Corp. agrees to combine with Nynex Corp. in a deal valued
at $22.7 billion; United Kingdom's British Telecom proposes to take over Washington-based
MCI Communications Corp., the nation's second-largest long-distance company, for $20 billion.
Announced November 1996; The Walt Disney Co. buys Capital Cities/ABC Inc. for $19 billion.
Completed Feb. 9, 1996, one day after law enacted; Local phone company, SBC Communications
Inc., agrees to buy Pacific Telesis Group for $16.7 billion. Announced April 1996; WorldCom
Inc. agrees to acquire MFS Communications Co. for $12 billion. Completed December 1996;
Bell company US West Corp. proposed to buy third largest-cable company, Continental
Cablevision Inc., for $10.8 billion. Announced February 1996; Time Warner Inc. takes over
Turner Broadcasting System Inc. in deal valued at $7.57 billion, creating the world's largest
entertainment company. Completed October 1996; Largest radio station owner. Westinghouse
Electric Corp. (parent of CBS Inc.) buys number two radio company, Infinity Broadcasting Corp.,
for $3.9 billion, creating nation's largest radio owner. Completed December 1996): see also BEN
H. BAGDIKIAN. THE MEDIA MONOPOLY 5 (1990):
In 1981 twenty corporations controlled most of the business of the country's 11,000
magazines, but only seven years later that number had shrunk to three corporations.
... Today, despite more than 25,000 outlets in the United States, twenty-three
corporations control most of the business in daily newspapers, magazines,
televisions, books and motion pictures.... [B]y the year 2000 all United States
media may be in the hands of six conglomerates.
Id; HERBERT I. SCHILLER, CULTURE, INC.: THE CORPORATE TAKEOVER OF PUBLIC EXPRESSION

35 (1989) ("A prediction made in the mid-1980s that by 1995 almost 90 percent of all
communication facilities (including newspapers, broadcast outlets, cable systems, telephone

lines, relays and satellites) would be in the hands of fifteen companies is close to realization well
before that date.").
4. Jerry Mander, The Dark Side of Globalization: What the Media Are Missing, NATION,
July 15, 1996, at 13; see also DAVID MORLEY & KEVIN ROBBINS. SPACES & IDENTITY: GLOBAL
MEDIA, ELECTRONIC LANDSCAPES & CULTURAL BOUNDARIES (1995); JOHN TOMLINSON,
CULTURAL IMPERIALISM: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991); Rosemary J. Coombe, Publicity

Rights and Political Aspiration: Mass Culture, Gender Identity and Democracy, 26 New. Eng. L.
Rev. 1221 (1992).
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of the Nation-state by the private corporate
The colonization
5
hand.
at
is
sovereigns
Almost every where you go in today's "global village," you'll
find multilane highways, concrete cities and a cultural landscape
featuring gray business suits, fast food chains, Hollywood films
and cellular phones. In the remotest corner of the planet, Barbie
and Madonna are familiar icons, and the Marlboro Man and
Rambo define the male ideal. From Cleveland to6 Cairo to
Caracas, Baywatch is entertainment and CNN is news.
Western media images are transforming the world and constructing a
hegemonic world culture modeled on the rampant consumerism of the
"[A]dvertising and media images exert powerful
United States.
psychological pressures to seek a better, more 'civilized' life, based on the
urban, Western consumerist model. Individual and cultural self-esteem are
stereotypes of happy, blond, blue-eyed, clean
eroded by the advertising
7
Western consumers."
In examining the effect of the distillation of information producers
into a handful of mega corporations on global culture, it is helpful to look
at how this same distillation has affected the national culture. This Article
focuses on the flattening of democratic debate within the United States as a
result of the concentration of information production in the hands of a few
whose primary interest has little to do with promoting the public good, but
rather in making money.
Throughout the history of the United States, the demonized image of
government has been the primary aggressor on the battlefield of selfexpression. The Constitution explicitly protects the individual from
governmental interference with free speech. As we approach the twentyfirst century, the attack on free speech has increasingly been an attack by
private parties. The attack is often invisible and unconstrained by
constitutional protections because the parties are private. Thus, under the
surface of the cheerful headlines announcing the marriage of Disney and
ABC Network lies the unreported and malignant illness that has afflicted

THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF
5. See generally PETER DICKEN, GLOBAL SHIFT:
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY (1982); WILLIAM GREIDER, ONE WORLD, READY OR NOT (1997); SASKIA
SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY: NEW YORK, LONDON, TOKYO (1991); Rosemary J. Coombe, The
Cultural Life of Things: Anthropological Approaches to Law and Society in the Conditions of
Globalization, 10 AM. U. L.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 791 (1995).
6. Helena Norberg-Hodge, Break Up the Monoculture, NATION, July 15, 1996, at 20; see
also GuY DEBORD, THE SOCIETY OF THE SPECTACLE 29 (Donald Nicholson-Smith trans. 1994).
7. Norberg-Hodge, supra note 6, at 22.
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the First Amendment. 8 While the distillation of information has direct and
profound consequences on the dissemination of information,9 enhanced
protection for the products of information producers has added to the
impending crisis.'°
The focal point of this Article is the increased protections afforded the
owners of intellectual property within the United States, specifically
through anti-dilution laws, and the effects of increased ownership in social
and cultural signifiers on personal expression and cultural formation. This
exploration begins with a discussion of symbols as sites of cultural
contestation whose meanings change over time through both individual and
cultural recodification. Part II briefly explores the role of symbols as
consumption objects within the context of postmodernity, specifically
detailing the role of consumption objects in the construction of self. Part
III discusses anti-dilution laws and gives examples of how the courts have
applied anti-dilution. Finally, this Article argues that by allowing increased
ownership control over the meanings embedded in cultural texts,
specifically trademarks, courts and the law ignore the important role that
commodified cultural symbols play in identity formation.
II. SYMBOLS AS LITERATURE

Symbols have been used throughout human history to express in a
concise, visual format what would take a "thousand words" to express
verbally. Symbols are the embodiment of multiple levels of textual
information; a hierarchy of meaning. However, the texts embodied by
symbols do not remain stagnant over time. The meanings and texts of
symbols change over time because they become part of the dialogic process
of recodification and rescripting of meaning.'"
8. HERBERT I. SCHILLER, INFORMATION INEQUALITY: THE DEEPENING SOCIAL CRISIS IN

AMERICA 43-45 (1996).
9. See generally id.
10. See generally Ruth L. Gana, Has Creativity Dies in the Third World? Some Implications
of the Internationalization of Intellectual Property, 24 DENV. J. INT'L. & POL'Y 109 (1995).
Allan Hutchinson, Talking the Good Life: From Free Speech to Democratic Dialogue, I YALE J.

L. & LIB. 28 (1989)
From McDonald's to General Motors and Sear to CBS, corporations are the
primary loci for socio-economic decisions and policymaking: how we put food on
the table, what food we put on the table, what we pay to put food on the table, what
food we think we should put on the table are all questions. That one shaped by
corporations.

..

[L]arge sections of the ruling elite ... remain beyond the reach of

popular control and the grasp of electoral accountants.
Id.
11. On dialogism see MICHEAL HOLQUIST, DIALOGISM; BAKHTION AND HIS WORLD 48
(1990) ("Existence is ...a vast web of interconnection each and all of which are linked as
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The swastika serves to illustrate both the point that the visual
messages sent by symbols are multiple and that the embodied meanings
change as a result of time and human interaction. The swastika is the
world's oldest known, and most widely dispersed symbol; the swastika
spans the history of human existence, originating with prehistoric man and
existing in postmodemity. It spans the globe, existing simultaneously in
the Americas, Europe and the Orient. Until recently, the swastika was
universally recognized as an amulet or charm, a sign of benediction, the
visual embodiment of a blessing for long life, good fortune and good luck.
This use of the swastika as an amulet represents the universal texts
embodied by the swastika; the first rank in the hierarchy of meaning.
Additional levels of meaning are also embodied by the swastika. As the
swastika was adopted by different cultures, it took on multiple texts, and
different visual forms of the swastika came to act not only as symbols of
good luck, but as symbols of religious or cultural affiliation.
The benign texts embodied by the swastika survived well into the
twentieth century, when it suddenly became the most vilified symbol of
human history. 1 The swastika no longer signified benign texts, but came
to be recognized as the embodiment of the Nazi party, and later as the
embodiment of all the horror of Nazi Germany. The power of the swastika,
with its newly acquired texts of horror, led to its being outlawed in
Germany in 1946 under German constitutional law.' 3 Today, the swastika
remains a symbol of Nazi Germany, and is used by "racists and hate groups
... [who] use evocative emblems both to distinguish themselves and to
signify their goals."' 4 In addition, it recalls instantaneously the violations
of human rights that are the hallmark of Nazi Germany.
The textual role of symbols and their relationship to both cultural and
personal identity, may be illustrated by examining the well-known HarleyDavidson trademark. Harley-Davidson's spread-winged eagle is generally
constitutive of flight and American political freedom. This symbol,
incorporated into corporate products and goods, also brands people through

participants in an event whose totality that no single one of us can ever know it. That event
manifests itself in the form of constant, ceaseless creation and exchange of meaning."); see also,
Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property Laws
and Democratic Dialogue,69 TEx. L. REV. 1853, 1877 (1990).
12. THOMAS WILSON, THE SWASTIKA: THE EARLIEST KNOWN SYMBOL, AND ITS
MIGRATIONS; WITH OBSERVATIONS ON THE MIGRATIONS OF CERTAIN INDUSTRIES IN

PREHISTORIC TIMES 770-92 (1996).
13. STEVEN HELLER, NEO-FASCIST FASHION: EMBLEMS OF THE NEW NATIONALISM, Print
XLVIiI:I. 42, 46 (1994).
14. STEVEN HELLER, WORLD CLASS ICONS: BLOOD AND IRON 42.46 (1994).
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the individual production of body art. 15 While Harley-Davidson can
generally be understood to represent personal freedom, within the HarleyDavidson subculture discrete groups interpret the core set of values
associated with Harley-Davidson
so as to render them consistent with their
"prevailing life structures." 16
III. TRADEMARKS IN THE CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY:
17
WE ARE WHAT WE CONSUME

The significance of trademarks, as the embodiment of textual
meaning, dramatically increases within the context of postmodernity due to
proliferation of commodified symbols as objects of consumption resulting
from the uncoupling of the real and the symbolic. "[O]ur vision of the
world and of ourselves is shaped by the words we use and by the images
that fill our fantasies. The words and images of trade are an important part
of this panorama"' 18 because

[i]n our consumer culture people do not define themselves
according to sociological constructs. They do so in terms of the
activities, objects, and relationships that give their lives
meaning. It is the objects, and consumer goods above all, that
substantiate their place in the social world. It is through objects
that they relate to other[s].19
In today's societies, symbols that once functioned simply to indicate
the source, origin, and quality of goods, have become products valued as
indicators of the "status, preferences, and aspirations of those who use
them. Some trademarks have worked their way into the
English language;
' 20
others provide bases for vibrant, evocative metaphors."
We live in the midst of codes, messages, and images which
produce and reproduce our lives. These may have had their
origins in commodity production, but have since won their
independence and usurped its role in the maintenance of social
relations. All that remains is the pleasure of playing in the
fragments, the disruption and resistance of the codes in which
15. John Schouten & James H. McAlexander, Subcultures of Consumption: An Ethnography
of the New Bikers, 22 J. CONSUMER RES. 43 (1995).
16. Id.
17. DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF POSTMODERNISM:
ORIGINS OF CULTURAL CHANGE (1990).

AN ENQUIRY INTO THE

18. Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 974 (1993).
19. Schouten & McAlexander, supra note 15.
20. Kozinski, supra note 18, at 965.
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we live, the jouissance of realizing that the search for meaning is
endlessly deferred and has no point of arrival and in the absence
of new movements,
styles or genres, the continual reiteration of
21
past.
the
of
those
Increasingly, trademarks are a self-contained
commodity that may be
22
marketed and sold to the general public.
[Capitalism by the] 1950s had expanded far beyond the mere
production of obvious necessities and luxuries; having satisfied
the needs of the body, capitalism as spectacle turned to the
desires of the soul. It turned upon individual men and women,
seized their subjective emotions and experiences, changed those
once evanescent phenomena into objective, replicable
commodities, placed them on the market, set their prices, and
sold them back to those who had, once, brought emotions and
experiences out of themselves-to people who as prisoners23 of
the spectacle could now find such things only on the market.
An extreme example is the sale of trademarks as cloth patches. In a
quick visit to a cloth or craft store one can pick up patches such as a
favorite sports emblem, Mickey or Minnie Mouse, and Winnie-the-Pooh.
When trademarks are used in this way, they acquire certain
functional characteristics that are different from-and
sometimes inconsistent with-their traditional role as identifiers
of source. This trend raises questions about whether-and to
what extent-the law should protect trademarks
when they are
24
pressed into service as separate products.
The repositing of trademarks as consumption objects requires
rethinking the legal protection afforded trademarks from use by nonowners
because the self is created and defined through the integration of these
objects with personal identity. Consumers may also use such objects to
classify themselves and build an identity of both association with and

21. SADIE PLANT, THE MOST RADICAL GESTURE: THE SITUATIONIST INTERNATIONAL IN A
POSTMODERN AGE 6-7 (1989).
22. Kozinski, supra note 18, at 961.
23. GREIL MARCUS, LIPSTICK TRACES: A SECRET HISTORY OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
101 (1989); see also GUY DEBORD, supra note 6, at 29:

The spectacle corresponds to the historical moment at which the commodity
completes its colonization of social life. It is not just that the relationship to
commodities is now plain to see-commodities are now all that there is to see; the
world we see is the world of the commodity.

Id.
24. Kozinski, supra note 18, at 962.
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differentiation from others. 25 The process of classification revolves around
the leveraging of personal interaction with the consumption object in order
to "communicate with others (where the "other" can also be oneself viewed
in the third person)" 26 something about themselves.
Spectator sports illustrate how trademarks are used to build affiliation
through the use of totemic symbols. Sports fans classify themselves
through objects by using the shared meanings associated with consumption
objects. Clothing that incorporates the team's insignia or trademark is a
primary tool in creating an identity, because spectators have a limited
ability to engage in the production of the game itself. Thus, spectators
focus on personalizing
the part of the game over which they have control,
27
themselves.

The process of integrating consumption objects into self-identity may
take one of two forms. Integration may occur through self-extension
processes that draw external objects into one's self-concept. 28 Secondly,
integration may be achieved by re-orienting the individual self-concept so
that it aligns with an institutionally defined identity. 29 Integration is
virtually automatic when consumers significantly participate in the creation
of the consumption object, acting simultaneously as producer and
consumer.
However, this ability to integrate decreases with the
proliferation and consumption of mass-produced consumption objects
because the reified quality of the object
prevents consumers from
30
participating in the production of the object.

25. Douglas B. Holt, How Consumers Consume: A Typology of Consumption Practices,22
J. CONSUMER RES. 1 (1995).
26. Id.
27. Igor Kopytoff, The CulturalBiography of Things: Commoditization as Process, in THE
SOCIAL LIFE OF THINGS: COMMODITIES IN CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 77 (Arjun Appadurai ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1986) ("[l]n any society, the individual is often caught between the
cultural structure of commoditization and his own personal attempts to bring a value order to the
universe of things.").
28. See, e.g., Russell W. Belk, Materialism: Trait Aspects of Living in the Material World,
12 J. CONSUMER RES. 265 (1985); Russell W. Belk, Possessions and the Extended Self, 15 J.
CONSUMER RES. 139 (1988); Melanie Wallendorf & John F. Sherry, Jr., The Sacred and Profane
in Consumer Behavior: Theodicy on the Odyssey, 16 J. CONSUMER RES. I(1989).
29. See, e.g., Homeyness: A Cultural Account of One Constellation of Consumer Goods
and Meanings, in INTERPRETIVE CONSUMER RESEARCH 168 (Elizabeth Hirschman ed., Ass'n for
Consumer Research 1989); Grant McCracken, Culture and Consumption: A Theoretical Account
of the Structure and Movement of the CulturalMeaning of Consumer Goods, 13 J. CONSUMER
RES. 71 (1986).
30. See generally Holt, supranote 25.
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Thus, symbols or trademarks are luxury goods, 3 1 defined by Arjun
Appadurai as "goods
whose• principal
use is rhetorical and social, goods
••
,,32
that are simply incarnated signs.
Increasingly, these goods or symbols
are construed as the property of others through active policing of the
exclusive right of use gained through federal trademark registration.
IV. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY

A. The TraditionalLegally Recognized Text of Trademarks
Trademarks are traditionally viewed as a source identifier. They are
words and designs whose purpose is to distinguish the goods or services of
one company from the goods or services of another company. 34 The
underlying premise in the treatment of trademarks as a source identifier
rests on the assumption that consumers read these identifiers as
representing consistency between goods bearing the same identifier-that
different goods bearing the same trademark emanate from the same source,
and that trademarks represent the promise of consistent quality. Justice
Frankfurter noted:
The protection of trade-marks is the law's recognition of the
psychological function of symbols. If it is true that we live by
symbols, it is no less true that we purchase goods by them....
The owner of a mark exploits this human propensity by making
every effort to impregnate the atmosphere of the market with the
drawing power of a congenial symbol.... [T]he aim is ... to

31. Arjun Appadurai, Commodities and the Politics of Value, in THE SOCIAL LIFE OF
THINGS: COMMODITIES IN CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 38 (Arjun Appadurai, ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1986) (Luxury goods are marked by some or all of the following attributes: (1) restriction,
either by price or by law, to elites; (2) complexity of acquisition, which may or may not be a
function of real "scarcity"; (3) semiotic virtuosity, that is, the capacity to signal fairly complex
social messages ... ; (4) specialized knowledge as a prerequisite for the 'appropriate'
consumption, that is, regulation by fashion; and (5) a high degree of linkage of their consumption
to body, person and personality.).
32. Id. at 38.
33. Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Propertyand Subjects of Politics:Intellectual Property
Law and DemocraticDialogue, 69 TEx. L. REV. 1853, 1866 (1991).
34. "'[Trademark' includes any word, name, symbol or device, or any combination thereof
...used ... to identify and distinguish his or her goods ... from those manufactured or sold by
others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown." 15 U.S.C. § 1127
(1994).
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convey through the mark
... the desirability of the commodity
35
upon which it appears.
This traditional view of a trademark as simply a symbol of origin,
quality and consistency ignores the role that trademarks play in identity
formation because it ignores the repositing of trademarks as consumption
goods. This is especially true under current formulations of the concept of
consumer confusion. Under the guise of protecting the consumer, courts
increasingly objectify and reify cultural forms, thereby "freezing the
connotations of signs and symbols and fencing off with 'No Trespassing'
36
signs" the very texts that embody cultural and personal meaning.
B. The Expanding Doctrine ofAnti-Dilution: The Uneasy Relationship
Between the Firstand Fifth Amendments
Overprotecting intellectual property is as harmful as
underprotecting it. Creativity is impossible without a rich public
domain. Nothing today, likely nothing since we tamed fire, is
genuinely new: Culture, like science and technology, grows by
accretion, each new creator building on the works of those who
came before. Overprotection
stifles the very creative forces it's
37
supposed to nurture.
In 1927, the proposition that trademarks should be protected from the
"gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the
public mind of the mark or name" was introduced to U.S. law. 38 Initially,
courts were hesitant to embrace this proposition, but over the course of the
1970s and 1980s, with
39•the increasing proliferation of state anti-dilution
40
statutes3 9 culminating in the adoption of federal anti-dilution provisions,

35. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942).
36. Coombe, supra note 33, at 1866.
37. White v. Samsung Elec. Am. Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting in the denial of a petition for a en banc rehearing).
38. Frank Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813,
825 (1927).
39. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-12-17 (Supp. 1984); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-71-113 (Michie
1987); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14330 (West Supp. 1989); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35l Ii(c) (West 1987); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6, § 3313 (Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 495.151
(West 1988).
40. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c) (Remedies for dilution of famous marks):
(1) The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of
equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an injunction against
another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use
begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive
quality of the mark, and to obtain such other relief as is provided in this subsection.
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Anti-dilution statutes protect trademarks from the
it was accepted.
"likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive

quality of a mark" even absent competition between the parties, or
confusion as to the source of goods or services.

Dilution has gradually

been extended to include protection against the "blurring" of trademark's
positive connotations by dissonant or unfavorable usage.4 Dilution of a
trademark occurs when the affirmative associations of the mark are

tarnished through unwholesome or unsavory mental associations.4 2

The

In determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a court may consider
factors such as, but not limited to(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods
or services with which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark:
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is
used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels
of trade used by the marks' owner and the person against whom the
injunction is sought;
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third
parties; and
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the
Act of February 20. 1905, or on the principal register.
(2) In an action brought under this subsection, the owner of the famous mark shall
be entitled only to injunctive relief unless the person against whom the injunction is
sought willfully intended to trade on the owner's reputation or to cause dilution of
the famous mark. If such willful intent is proven, the owner of the famous mark
shall also be entitled to the remedies set forth in sections I117(a) and I118 of this
title, subject to the discretion of the court and the principles of equity.
(3) The ownership by a person of a valid registration under the Act of March 3.
1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register shall be a
complete bar to an action against that person, with respect to that mark, that is
brought by another person under the common law or a statute of a State and that
seeks to prevent dilution of the distinctiveness of a mark, label, or form of
advertisement.
(4) The following shall not be actionable under this section:
(A)
Fair use of a famous mark by another person in comparative
commercial advertising or promotion to identify the competing goods or
services of the owner of the famous mark.
(B) Noncommercial use of a mark.
(C) All forms of news reporting and news commentary.
Id.
41. See. e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Exxene Corp., 696 F.2d 544, 550 (7th Cir. 1983); Jordache
Enters. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 625 F. Supp. 48, 52 (D.N.M. 1985) (noting that there is a risk of
"'erosion of the public's identification" of a trademark, diminishing its distinctiveness,
uniqueness, effectiveness and prestige (quoting Tiffany & Co. v. Boston Club, Inc., 231 F. Supp.
836, 844 (D. Mass. 1964))).
42. Mead Data Cent. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1031 (2d Cir.
1989); Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 648 F. Supp. 905, 912 (D. Neb. 1986)
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underlying premise of anti-dilution law is that the primary value43 of a
public.
trademark lies in its ability to convey positive meaning to the
Anti-dilution law protects trademarks from negative associations that
might harm the value of the mark, even when these associations are
actually true, as evidenced by the injunction granted to Coca-Cola against
the creators of a poster reading "Enjoy Cocaine" printed in the same
typeface used in the "Enjoy Coca-Cola" advertisements. 44 The judge who
granted the injunction noted that people might be unwilling to consume
goods sold by a company who treated such a "dangerous drug in such a
jocular fashion. 4 5 The judge overlooked, or perhaps simply didn't care
about, Coca-Cola's very real historical usage of cocaine.
A similar attitude was adopted in 1987, by the Eighth Circuit when
they granted Mutual of Omaha an injunction against the use of a logo using
the words "Mutant of Omaha" coupled with a side view of an emaciated
human head wearing a feather headdress. 7 This logo was originally
marketed on T-shirts with the additional text of "Nuclear Holocaust
Insurance" imprinted on them. 48 The design was also applied to
sweatshirts, caps, buttons, and coffee mugs that were offered for sale at
retail shops, exhibitions, and fairs. 49 The merchandise was advertised on
television and in newspapers and magazines. 50 The court found this to be
an infringement of the Mutual of Omaha trademark in that the design
bearing words "Mutant of Omaha" and depicting a side view of a featherbonneted, emaciated human head created likelihood of confusion as to the
insurance company's sponsorship of or affiliation with designer's
merchandise. 51 The court found that confusion rather than competition
should be used to determine trademark infringement. 52 The court refused
to acknowledge a First Amendment defense so long as alternative means,
not restricted by the injunction, existed by which the designer could
express his views.
43. Schechter, supra note 38, at 825.
44. See Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1193 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
45. Id. at 1191.
46. See E. KAHN, THE BIG DRINK: AN UNOFFICIAL HISTORY OF COCA-COLA 54-55, 10103 (1960) (Coca-Cola contained cola nuts, caffeine, and a derivative of coca leaves that included,
prior to 1906, trace amounts of cocaine).
47. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 398 (8th Cir. 1987).
48. Id. at 398.
49. Id.

50. Id.
51. Id. at 400.
52. Id.at 399.
53. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d at 402.
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The Eighth Circuit has reiterated its commitment to preserving the
exclusive right of use given to a trademark owner in Anheuser-Busch, Inc.
v. Balducci Publications.54 Rich and Kathleen Balducci published, from
their apartment, a low-budget, usually free tabloid approximately four
55
times a year called "Snicker" with circulation of about 13,000 copies.
The back cover of Snicker's Spring 1989 issue featured a full page fake
advertisement for a beer dubbed "Michelob Oily." 56 The parody ran after
Anheuser-Busch temporarily stopped manufacturing beer because a Shell
Oil pipeline rupture had contaminated its water supply. 57
The
advertisement was an illustration depicting a hand holding a beer can with
an oil spout with oil pouring from the can onto a fish, coupled with the
slogan, "One taste and you'll drink it oily," intended to mock the Michelob
slogan "One drink and you'll drink it dry." 58 At the bottom of the page
was a Shell Oil logo, and an illustration resembling the Anheuser-Busch "A
& Eagle" design depicting the eagle covered in oil and exclaiming
"Yuck." 59 Text on the very bottom of the page read, "At the rate it's being
dumped into our oceans, lakes and rivers, you'll drink it oily sooner or
later, anyway. '60 A disclaimer stating this was a "Snicker Magazine
Editorial by Rich Balducci, Art by Eugene Ruble" was positioned running
up the right hand side of the page.
The Eighth Circuit, in granting the injunction, applied a two step
test.62 First, the court determined the likelihood of confusion, and then
determined if the resulting likelihood of confusion was outweighed by First
Amendment concerns. The court concluded that the similarity between
Balducci's editorial and a real Michelob ad were similar enough to create a
likelihood of confusion and so any social commentary he sought to make
was outweighed
by trademark law's objective of avoiding consumer
63
confusion.

These decisions, and others like them, 64 protect the property rights of
the trademark owner over individual rights of free expression by failing to
54. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994).
55. Id. at 772.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Anheuser-Busch, 28 F.3d at 772.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 776.
63. Id. at 777.
64. See also Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d
Cir. 1979) (rejecting a First Amendment argument on grounds that property rights, such as
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balance the constitutionally protected rights in property with the
constitutionally protected right of freedom to individual expression.65
They instead, give property rights precedence over First Amendment rights.
As noted by Rosemary Coombe, anti-dilution laws are "the perfect tool for
corporate overreaching" when they are used to "preclude the use of a
trademark in noncompeting contexts in ways that have no potential to
confuse consumers."
A better approach to balancing First Amendment
with Fifth Amendment concerns involves a simultaneous analysis of the
constitutionally protected rights at stake. 67 Courts using this approach have
refused to grant injunctions against the unauthorized use 68of trademarks
when the trademarks are an important part of the expression.
trademark rights, can supersede the exercise of free speech when alternative means of
communicating the message are available); Chemical Corp. of Am. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.. 306
F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1962) (holding that floor wax and insecticide maker's slogan, "Where there's
life, there's bugs:: harmed strength of defendant's slogan, "'Where there's life, there's Bud.");
American Express Co. v. Vibra Approved Lab. Corp. 10 U.S.P.Q.2d. (BNA) 2006, 2013
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (stating that defendant's "condom card" using the name "America Express" and
the slogan "Never Leave Home Without It" was seen to threaten the distinctiveness of the
American Express card as a symbol of quality and prestige); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc.
v. Topps Chewing Gum, 642 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (merchandiser of "Garbage Pail
Kids" stickers and products injured owner of Cabbage Patch Kids mark); D.C. Comics, Inc. v.
Unlimited Monkey Bus., 598 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (holder of Superman and Wonder
Woman trademarks damaged by unauthorized use of marks by singing telegram franchiser);
Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prod., Inc. 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
65. Madhavi Sunder, Authorship and Autonomy as Rites of Exclusion: The Intellectual
Propertizationof Free Speech in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay. Lesbian and Bisexual Group of
Boston, 49 STAN. L. REV. 141, 144-45 (1996) ("Although historically the concept of free speech

arguably has been used as a bulwark against the absolute entitlements of property" the increasing
propertization of free speech has led courts to imbue the First Amendment with the "same
entitlements as private property: the rights of unconstrained use, exclusivity, and selective
transfer.").
66. Rosemary J. Coombe, Authorial Cartographies: Mapping Proprietary Borders in a
Less-Than-Brave New World, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1357, 1366 (1996).

67. The few cases decided under the 1995 Federal Trademark Dilution Act have favored the
property rights of the trademark owners. See generally Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Teoppen, 1996
WL 653726 (S.D. Cal. 1996); Clinique Lab., Inc. v. Dep Corp., 1996 WL 583395 (S.D.N.Y
1996); Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E. Windows Corp., 937 F.
Supp. 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Wawa, Inc. v. D. Haaf, I,1996 WL 460083 (E.D. Pa.). But see Dr.
Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (holding
that expressive use is not rendered commercial merely through sales). In Dr. Seuss Enterprises,
the court found that the defendant's book was a parody of Dr. Seuss' trademark and thus
protected expression under the First Amendment.
68. See also Nike v. "Just Did It" Enters., 6 F.3d 1225 (7th Cir. 1993) (reversed summary
judgment finding that "MIKE," "JUST DID IT," and swoosh symbol on T-shirts and sweatshirts
infringed "NIKE," "JUST DO IT" and swoosh symbol, and remanded to ascertain likelihood of
confusion at trial); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L & L Wings Inc., 962 F.2d 316 (4th Cir. 1992)
(upholding jury finding that the phrase "'This Beach is For You," on beach towels was not
actionable parody.); Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1987)
(LARDASHE jeans for large-size women held not violative of famous JORDACHE jeans).
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The balancing of free speech concerns along with property concerns
is exemplified by the First Circuit's 1987 decision in L.L. Bean, Inc. v.
Drake Publishers, Inc.69 In October 1984, High Society, a monthly
periodical featuring adult erotic entertainment, contained a two-page article
entitled "L.L. Beam's Back-To-School-Sex-Catalog. ' 7° The article was
labeled on the magazine's contents page as "humor" and "parody. 7 1 The
article displayed a facsimile of Bean's trademark and featured pictures of
nude models in sexually explicit positions using "products" that were
L.L. Bean sought a
described in a crude and humorous fashion.
temporary restraining order to remove the issue from circulation. 73 The
First Circuit held that the limits of the property interest in a trademark were
such that the First Amendment issue could not be summarily dismissed by
merely asserting that the property owner's interest supersedes the
individual's interest in the exercise of First Amendment rights. 74 The court
stated that "[t]rademark rights do not entitle the owner to quash an
unauthorized use of the mark by another who is communicating ideas or
expressing points of view. ' 75 Thus, the court found that the application of
Maine's anti-dilution statute to High Society's noncommercial parody of
L.L. Bean's trademark would violate the First Amendment because the
magazine had not used the mark to identify or market goods or services,
but solely to identify the owner of the trademark as the object of parody.
Like the First Circuit, the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia recognizes the serious First Amendment concerns implicit in
enjoining the unauthorized use of trademarks when the trademark is used in
the expression of ideas. In Lucasfilm Ltd. v. High Frontier,76 the court
refused to apply the confusion, misappropriation, or dilution rationales to
bar the defendants' use of plaintiffs trademark in the term "Star Wars."
The term "Star Wars" was being used by the defendants, comprised of
various public interest groups, in television advertisements to express a
variety of views surrounding the Reagan Administration's Strategic
Defense Initiative.7 7 The court refused to enjoin this use of the trademark,

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
(D.D.C.
76.
77.

L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987).
Id. at 27.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 29.
811 F.2d at 29 (citing Lucasfilm Ltd. v. High Frontier, 622 F. Supp. 931, 933-35
1985)).
Lucasfilm Ltd. v. High Frontier, 622 F. Supp. 931 (D.D.C. 1985).
Id.at 932.
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finding that the limited property rights conferred by a trademark did not
include the right to exclude the use of certain words in all contexts. 7 8 The
court found that, despite the fact that the descriptive meaning of "Star
Wars" was originally derived from Lucasfilm's trademark, the defendants'
use of the term was protected expression because the only activity, in using
the term "Star Wars," was the communication of their ideas; courts "cannot
regulate the type of descriptive, non-trade use involved here without
becoming the monitors of the spoken or written English language." 79 The
court further stated that even if Lucasfilm could prove the potential for
injurious confusion or a weakening of the strength of the mark, an
injunction would be inappropriate because, "[I]t would be wholly
unrealistic and unfair to allow the owner
of a mark to interfere in the give80
discourse."
political
normal
of
and-take
C. The FirstAmendment Does Not Guaranteethe Most Effective Form of
Speech; or Are ProhibitionsAgainst Nonowners' Use of Trademarks
Simply the Regulation of the Time, Place, and Manner of Expression?
Courts, in giving preferential treatment to the rights of trademark
81
owners, rely on the Supreme Court's holding in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner.
In Lloyd, the Supreme Court gave the owner of real property the right to
exclude picketers from that property. Reliance on Lloyd has led courts to
conclude, by analogy, that the unauthorized use of a trademark must yield
to an assertion of trademark ownership. While the real property analogue
may at times be useful, when applied to trademarks it has become distorted.
This distortion leads to limitations, not only the place of expression, but
also on the content of that expression. This analogy, when applied to
trademarks, reposits the regulation of the content of expressive material as
simply the regulation of the place, time and manner in which it may be
said. 82 The First Circuit noted that restricting the use of trademarks may
78. Id. at 933.

79. Id. at 935.
80. Lucasflm Ltd., 622 F. Supp. at 935.
81. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
82. Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: ConstitutionalImplicationsof the Emerging
Rationalesfor the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 WiS. L. REV. 158, 165 ("The danger in
utilizing a property conception of trademark ... goes beyond its inadequacies as a descriptive
theory. When adopted, it inevitably assumes a normative role, producing a mode of analysis
incapable of transcending doctrine, thus precluding a rational consideration of competing social,
economic, and occasionally, constitutional, interests."); Wendy J. Gordon, Reality as Artifact:
From Feist to Fair Use, 55 L. & ComrEMP. PROBS. 93, 101 (1992) ("Too broad a set of
intellectual property rights can give one set of persons control over how ... reality is viewed,
perceived, interpreted-control over what the world means.").

1997]

HOW THE WORLD DREAMS ITSELF TO BE AMERICAN

539

restrict the communication of ideas because "trademarks offer a
particularly powerful means of conjuring up the image of their owners and
thus become an important, perhaps at times indispensable, part of the
public vocabulary."
The problems of allowing ownership in text may be more clearly
depicted through an example of ownership in a word as opposed to a
symbol. 84 Under the Amateur Sports Act, 5 the United States Olympic
Committee has been granted the exclusive right to use the term "Olympic"
in certain enumerated circumstances.8 6 The Supreme Court upheld this

83. L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 30-31 (criticizing the application of Lloyd to intellectual
property, specifically trademarks).
84. See, e.g., San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483
U.S. 522 (1987).
85. 36 U.S.C. § 380 (1994).
86. Section 110 of the Act provides:
(a) Without the consent of the [USOC], any person who uses for the purpose of
trade, to induce the sale of any goods or services, or to promote any theatrical
exhibition, athletic performance, or competition(1) the symbol of the International Olympic Committee, consisting of 5
interlocking rings;
(2) the emblem of the [USOC], consisting of an escutcheon having a blue
chief and vertically extending red and white bars on the base with 5
interlocking rings displayed on the chief;
(3) any trademark, trade name, sign, symbol, or insignia falsely
representing association with, or authorization by, the International Olympic
Committee or the [USOC]; or...
(4) the words 'Olympic,' 'Olympiad,' 'Citius Altius Fortius,' or any
combination or simulation thereof tending to cause confusion, to cause
mistake, to deceive, or to falsely suggest a connection with the [USOC] or
any Olympic activity; shall be subject to suit in a civil action by the [USOC]
for the remedies provided in the Act of July 5, 1946 (60 Stat. 427; popularly
known as the Trademark Act of 1946). However, any person who actually
used the emblem in subsection (a)(2) of this section, or the words, or any
combination thereof, in subsection (a)(4) of this section for any lawful
purpose prior to September 21, 1950, shall not be prohibited by this section
from continuing such lawful use for the same purpose and for the same
goods or services. In addition, any person who actually used, or whose
assignor actually used, any other trademark, trade name, sign, symbol, or
insignia described in subsections (a)(3) and (4) of this section for any lawful
purpose prior to September 21, 1950, shall not be prohibited by this section
from continuing such lawful use for the same purpose and for the same
goods or services.
(b) The [USOC] may authorize contributors and suppliers of goods or services to
use the trade name of the [USOC] as well as any trademark, symbol, insignia, or
emblem of the International Olympic Committee or of the [USOC] in advertising
that the contributions, goods, or services were donated, supplied, or furnished to or
for the use of, approved, selected, or used by the [USOC] or United States Olympic
or Pan-American team or team members.
(c) The [USOC] shall have exclusive right to use the name 'United States Olympic
Committee'; the symbol described in subsection (a)(1) of this section; the emblem
described in subsection (a)(2) of this section; and the words 'Olympic,'
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right when a San Francisco based gay advocacy group sponsored a gay
Olympics. The Supreme Court found that barring the use of the word
"Olympic" in the context of the "gay Olympic games" did not prohibit the
conveyance of a political statement about the status of homosexuals in
society because87 the statute restricted only the manner in which the message
was delivered.
Justice Brennan dissented, stating that the restrictive use of the word
"Olympic" was not simply a restriction of the time, place, and manner by
which a message could be conveyed, but a restriction on the content of the
message. 88 Brennan argued that the San Francisco Arts and Athletics
Association, in using the word "Olympic," intended to "promote a realistic
image of homosexual men and women that would help them move into the
mainstream of their communities. ' 89 Thus, the injunction against the San
Francisco Arts and Athletics Association's use of the word "Olympic"
violated the First Amendment because it prohibited the use of a word for
which no adequate translation existed. 90 Brennan further asserted that,
even if a translation could be found, the First Amendment protects more
than the right to mere translation because a translation can never fully
express the original.
When we look at particular words, it is not their translation into
statements of equivalence that we should seek but an
understanding of the possibilities they represent for making and
changing the world.... Such words do not operate in ordinary
speech as restatable concepts but as words with a life and force
of their own. They cannot be replaced with definitions, as
though they were parts of a closed system, for they constitute
unique resources, of mixed fact and value, and their translation
into other terms would destroy their nature. Their meaning
resides not in their reducibility to other terms but in their
irreducibility.... They operate indeed
in part as gestures, with
91
a meaning that cannot be restated.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has acknowledged the danger of censoring
expressive content by prohibiting the use of individual words. In Cohen v.
'Olympiad,' 'Citius Altius Fortius,' or any combination thereof subject to the
preexisting rights described in subsection (a) of this section.
36 U.S.C. § 380 (1994).
87. San FranciscoArts & Athletics. Inc. 483 U.S. at 535-42.

88. Id. at 548.
89. Id. at 569.

90. Id.
91. Id. at 570 n.33 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting J. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR
MEANING 11 (1984)).
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California,92 the Supreme Court recognized that words were not
interchangeable with either their definition or other words. The Cohen
Court stated:
[W]e cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid
particular words without also running a substantial risk of
suppressing ideas in the process. Indeed, governments might
soon seize upon the censorship of particular words as a
convenient guise for banning the expression of unpopular views.
We have been able ... to discern little social benefit that might

result from
running the risk of opening the door to such grave
93
results.
The inability to fully express oneself through substitute words or
translation was simply illustrated by Judge Kozinski when he observed that
a jacket reading "I Strongly Resent the Draft"
would not convey the same
94
message as a jacket reading "Fuck the draft."
While both Cohen and San Francisco Arts & Athletics involve the
permissible or impermissive use of words, the restriction of nonowners' use
of trademarks is likewise an impermissive censorship of content because
"trademarks are the emerging linguafranca:with a sufficient command of
these terms, one can make oneself understood the world over." 95 Trio, a
graphic design group from Sarajevo, created a set of twenty-five postcards
using familiar Western trademarks to convey their demand for the return of
their most fundamental human right, the right to exist. The use of familiar
Western images was adopted in an attempt to introduce, to the West, the
unfamiliar with familiar imagery. One postcard, entitled "Andy Warhol's
Campbell Soup Redesigned by Trio Sarajevo," depicts a Warhol
Campbell's soup can, empty, and riddled with bullet holes. The image
communicates multiple messages including those of hunger, destruction of
life, and the destruction of cultural heritage. Another postcard uses the
symbol of the United Nations coupled with the text "1993, Disunited
Nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina" to represent the inability of the United
96
Nations to prevent the "dismemberment of Bosnia and Herzegovina."
These postcards are representative of the value of using trademarks as
something other than a source indicator. Under current applications of
Lloyd to trademarks, it is likely that Trio would have been required to use

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

403 U.S. 15 (1971).
Id.at 26.
Cohen v. California, 789 F.2d 1319, 1321 (9th Cir. 1986).
Kozinski, supra note 18, at 966.
Cedomir Kostovic, PostcardsFrom Sarajevo, Print,May/June 1994, at 92, 95.
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an alternative format in expressing their ideas so as to avoid trademark
infringement liability. What can be clearly understood from Trio's work is
that symbols have the ability to convey meaning across the globe because
they are not restricted by language barriers, and they often have a
uniformity of meaning that is understood across cultures. Courts that
restrict this ability to convey meaning in a universally recognizable way
restrict freedom of expression. Trademarks, as language, properly belong
to the people, and just as words are not interchangeable, one
97 symbol is not
interchangeable with another, or with a collection of words.
Where the trademark is an inextricable part of the message, no
alternative means of expression exist, and inquiry into alternatives rests on
the perception that the content of the message can be conveyed absent the
protected trademark. Alternative means of communication, such as words,
often lack the communicative power of symbols, and unless the
government has banned all alternatives, an alternative method of
communication will exist. Asking courts to determine whether the
"alternatives are 'adequate' opens an inquiry into the capacity of various
media to convey emotion and other highly nuanced and elusive aspects of
symbolic speech."9g If the trademark is an integral part of the message
being conveyed then courts should99be hesitant to grant injunctions barring
the trademark's use by nonowners.
The recodification of cultural imagery by nonowners is central
to the process of creating culture because meanings expressed
through systems of signification are, by definition, perpetually
unstable, they are always capable of being deployed against the
grain. The ambiguities and traces of cultural forms may be
seized upon by those who may well repeat, imitate, and
appropriate elements of a dominant cultural order while
97. One could also examine the Negativland of trademarks owned by fast food restaurants
such as McDonald's to expose how economic imperialism contributes to continued human rights
violations in the third world, as well as environmental destruction throughout the world available
at <http://www.envirolink.org/mcspotlight/home.html>.

See also ADBUSTERS:

J.

MENTAL

ENV'T, Winter 1996 (deconstructing consumer capitalism and mass marketing through the
Negativland of trademarks and advertising images). The front cover of the Winter 1996 issue
features a traditional Quaker Oats package. The quaker is replaced with an image of presidential
candidate Bob Dole, the product is named "Dole Oats" and is supported by the caption, "Good
Old-Fashioned Blandness." Id.
98. William E. Lee, The Futile Searchfor Alternative Media in Symbolic Speech Cases, 8
CONST. CoM. 451, 455 (1991).
99. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 416 n.l I (1989) (stating that the Texas anti-flag

burning law was unconstitutional; the court's hostility content regulation "is not dependent upon
the particular mode in which one chooses to express an idea;" and the availability of alternative
means of communication was insufficient to justify the law).
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critically marking differences in social experience,
0 0 legal forums
deployments.'
such
undermine
or
may legitimate
Recodification allows individuals to push and contest social
boundaries and the unexamined privileges of normality (i.e., white, straight
and male). This power is exemplified in the co-opting of Matt Groening's
character Bart Simpson by Queer Nation. Bart, as produced on a T-shirt
conceived of by Queer Nation, becomes a "New York gay clone: he wears
an earring, his own Queer Nation T-shirt, and a pink triangle button"'' l and
exclaims "'Get Used to it Dude!"'l2 Queer Nation's ability to capitalize on
popular media images is further illustrated through the organization's series
of pseudo-advertisements using popular Gap clothing advertisements
featuring gay, bisexual and polymorphous celebrities. The "p" in Gap's
logo is changed to a "y." These pseudo-advertisements were designed to
accomplish two goals. First, they "out" the closeted gays and bisexual
celebrities used in the ad, and secondly, they serve to "out" the use of gay
style to sell clothes. 10 3 The use of popular media images by Queer Nation
allow them to engage in the dialogic process of cultural formation by
appropriating the power 104
of popular media to contest, create, and
norms.
cultural
disseminate

100. Rosemary J. Coombe, Contingent Articulations: A Critical Cultural Studies of Law, in
LAW INTHE DOMAINS OF CULTURE (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, ed. forthcoming 1997).
101. LAUREN BERTLANT & ELIZABETH FREEMAN, QUEER NATIONALITY, FEAR OF A QUEER
PLANET: QUEER POLITICS AND SOCIAL THEORY 209 (1985); see also HAL FOSTER, RECORDINGS:
ARTS, SPECTACLE, CULTURAL POLITICS 170 (1985):
Subcultural practice differs from the countercultural (e.g., 60s student movements)
in that it recodes cultural signs rather than poses a revolutionary program of its
own .... [T]he subcultural must be grasped as a textual activity. Plural and
symbolic, its resistance is performed through a 'spectacular transformation of the
whole range of commodities, values, common-sense attitudes, etc.' through a
parodic collage of the privileged signs of gender, class and race that are contested,
confirmed, 'customized.' In this bricolage the false nature of these stereotypes is
exposed as the arbitrary character of the social/sexual lines they define.
1d.; STUART HALL, ENCODING/DECODING IN CULTURE, MEDIA, LANGUAGE (Stuart Hall et al.
eds., 1980); Keith Aoki, Adrift in the Intertext: Authorship and Audience "Recoding" Rights, 68
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 805, 810 (1993); Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 539
(considering how changes in consumption patterns in the African American community may
constitute potent weapons of political and cultural resistance).
102. BERTLANT & FREEMAN, supra note 101, at 209.
103. Id. at 214.
104. The rock band Negativland attempted to employ similar tactics of Negativland. The
band produced a single entitled U2 Negativland. The rock band named U2 promptly filed suit to
have the albums enjoined and removed from stores. Additionally, Casey Kasem accused the
band of theft and piracy because the album contained samples taken from a recording of a Casey
Kasem show. The single was removed from stores and has yet to reappear. See generally
NEGATIVLAND, FAIR USE: THE STORY OF THE LETER U AND THE NUMERAL 2 (1995).

544

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17

D. Trademark Ownership:
Legally Recognized Limitations on Identity Formation
[T]he silence and silencing of people begins with the dominating
enforcement of linguistic conventions, the resistance to
relational dialogues, as well as the
disenablement of peoples by
05
speech.'
of
forms
their
outlawing
Courts, in analyzing the relationship between the First Amendment
and the property rights of trademark owners, focus on the need to protect
political or social commentary and criticism versus the need to protect the
property rights of trademark owners. This dichotomy obscures the way in
which ownership in text displaces the abilit0y6 of individuals to engage in the
creation of self and cultural identity.
The employment of this
dichotomy, and the way that it obscures the underlying issue of identity
formation, is exemplified by San Francisco Arts and Athletics where the
expressed need of the gay community was to counteract negative societal
stereotypes of homosexuals through the development of the Gay Olympics.
The Gay Olympics were designed to counteract the societal myth that gay
men are unathletic and not fit for rigorous competition, as well as to
provide a forum in which lesbians could compete athletically without being
made to feel that their athletic ability made them less feminine., ° 7 Thus,
the Gay Olympics was created both as a way to participate in the ongoing
process of cultural formation by changing culturally held stereotypes about
homosexuals, and to aid in the development of personal identity, as
exemplified by the expressed need to provide lesbians an environment in

105. Norma Alarcon, The theoretical subject(s) of THIS BRIDGE CALLED MY BACK AND
ANGLO-AMERICAN FEMINISM,
THEORY 149 (Cambridge Univ.
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Press 1994).

106. Coombe, supra note 33, at 1863 ("Uruguay Rounds, GATT systems, Dunkel Drafts,
'Special 301s," and TRIPS Agreement enforcement provisions-these legal instruments and
institutions that so effectively enforce borders ...do so by putting 'NO TRESPASSING' signs
around the cultural forms and representations that provide the resources with which new identities
and communities are ... forged."); Madhavi Sunder, Authorship and Autonomy as Rites of
Exclusion: The Intellectual Propertization of Free Speech in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 49 STAN. L. REV. 143, 156-57 (1996).

Property law ... is not an appropriate source for governing social learning and
discourse. Although valid arguments exist for the creation of property rights in
speech for minority and majority groups alike, these attempts reach an impasse
when confronting the complexities of identity in today's society. Rather than a
property right in speech, today's identity based politics need a revamped, cultureconscious First Amendment jurisprudence.
Id.
107. William A. Henry, I11,
Prideand Prejudice,TIME, June 27, 1994 at 54.
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which their femininity was not questioned because of their athletic
achievements and abilities.
By failing to acknowledge the important role of trademarks in identity
formation, the courts fail to understand the full implications of denying
nonowners trademark use. To understand this proposition, it is necessary
First, in
to return to two of this Article's initial propositions.
postmodernity, self identity is constructed through the integration of
consumption objects with self, and "the consumption of commodified
representational forms is a productive activity in which people engage in
08
meaning-making to adapt signs, texts, and images to their own agendas."'
Second, the process of integration and adaptation can occur in one of two
ways: either through self-extension processes that draw consumption
objects into one's self-concept or through the reorientation of one's selfconcept so that it aligns with an institutionally defined identity.
The process of integration is almost automatic for consumption
objects in which the consumer acts as producer, but as consumers become
less able to participate in the production of the consumption object,
integration becomes increasingly difficult. The process of recodifying
symbols or trademarks allows for individual participation in the production
of trademarks because individuals are engaged in the production of
meaning, and trademarks, as consumption objects, are simply the
embodiment of meaning. Recodification enables individuals, through selfextension processes, to integrate trademarks by allowing for the
simultaneous consumption and creation of meaning. When courts chill
recodification by disallowing the use of trademarks by all but owners, they
chill the ability of the individual to act as both consumer and producer.
This in turn chills the individual's ability to engage in identity formation
through self-extension processes. Thus, as the subtexts or meanings
embodied by trademarks become increasingly fixed, individual identity
formation must take the second form, that of reorienting self conception in
a way that renders it consistent with institutionally defined and articulated
identities.
V.

CONCLUSION

When the manner in which identity is formed is understood, the
impact that the law has on identity formation is equally understood. Courts
truly become places of cultural performance;' 0 9 institutions in which the

108. Coombe, supra note 33, at 1862.
109. Martha Minow, Law and Social Change, 62 UMKC L. REv. 171 (1993).
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"events that produce transformations in socio-cultural practices and
consciousness" occur.110 The law, when it protects the exclusive right of
trademark owners against all uses by nonowners, enables an increasingly
smaller group of individuals, or corporations, to dictate how self is
constructed. As individuals become increasingly disenfranchised from the
production of meaning through the removal of texts from the dialogic
process of recodification, they become disenfranchised from the production
of cultural meaning because
Relationships between people shape identities which depend on
negotiations and interactions between oneself and others. The
relative power enjoyed by some people compared with others is
partly manifested through the ability to name oneself and others,
and to influence the process of negotiation over questions of
identity. "'
Increasingly, the only institute that is allowed to impregnate text with
meaning is Corporate America. Hence, the self will increasingly be
defined by Corporate America because the self will be forced to
reconfigure personal identity so as to render it consistent with those
identities articulated and approved by trademark owners. "[I]n a world
where mass media tends to monopolize the dissemination of signifying
forms, the cultural resources
available to us (and within us) are increasingly
2
the properties of others.""1
As individuals become disabled from the project of producing and
defining personal identity, they become disenabled from the project of
producing and defining cultural identity. If the self is authored through the
dialogic process of recodification of social signifiers,1 3 then the ownership
of these signs decreases the ability of individuals to impact cultural identity
formulation because they are quite simply barred from the creation of
meaning. "Those who do not have power over the story that dominates
their lives, power to retell it, power to rethink it, deconstruct it, joke about
it and change it as times change, truly are powerless, because they cannot

110. See JUNE STAR & JANE COLLIER, HISTORY AND POWER IN THE STUDY OF LAW: NEW
DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY (1989); Sally E. Merry, Law and Colonialism, 25 L. &
Soc'Y REv. 889, 892 (1991); Gerald Torres, Translating Yonnondio: By Precedent and
Evidence: The Mashpee Indian Case, 1990 DUKE L.J. 625, 628 ("IT]here are specific places
where most of the activities making up social life within that society simultaneously are
represented, contested, and inverted. Courts are such places.").
111. Martha Minow, Identities, 3 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 97, 98-99 (1991).
112. Coombe, supra note 33, at 1866.
113. Id. at 1876.
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think new thoughts." ' 14 The First Amendment was designed to protect the
public's right to "think new thoughts" through the protection of democratic
dialogue-a marketplace of ideas and information from which a collective
understanding of our national culture can emerge."

5

It "isn't just about

is about protecting the free development of our
religion or politics-it
6
national culture.""
While people in the United States have had a relatively strong right

and privilege to freely express themselves, a right to engage in democratic
discourse to counterbalance the property rights of corporations in imagery
as intellectual property protection laws is not exported. Many cultures will
be completely disabled from recodiflying corporate messages because the
First Amendment will not be there to free them from infringement. 117 The
packaging and sale of intellectual property protections as the "tried and

true" universally accepted minimum standards of protection is, at best, a
slick marketing job replete with puffery.118

114. Salman Rushdie, Excerpts from Rushdie's Address: 1,000 Days "Trapped Inside a
Metaphor," N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1991, at B8 (excerpts from a speech delivered at Columbia
University).
115. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am. Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1518 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting in the denial of a petition for a en banc rehearing).
116. Id.
117. The "export" of national norms is incomplete without the First Amendment or the idea
of fair use. These arguably provided a "safety valve" or counterbalance when maximalist
intellectual property claims threaten to eclipse speech interests.
118. Coombe, supra note 66, at 1366 ("Under the TRIPS Agreement, intellectual property
protections which are constitutionally questionable within the United States are represented as
universally-accepted minimal standards of protection.").
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